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Analysts seeking evidence of rising inflation often focus on the movements of a single 
indicator—an increase in the price of gold, for example, or a decline in the unemployment 
rate. But simple statistical tests reveal that such indicators, used in isolation, have very 
limited predictive power.
Controlling inflation—perhaps the most vital responsi-
bility of the Federal Reserve—requires a high degree 
of foresight. Because policy actions to curb inflation 
typically take effect only after a long lag, the Federal
Reserve needs to know in advance when inflation is
likely to rise. Consequently, to understand where prices
are headed and what policy steps are appropriate, policy-
makers turn to forecasts of inflation.
In this edition of Current Issues, we consider the
usefulness of certain “indicator variables” in forecast-
ing inflation. These variables—which include commod-
ity prices, financial market measures, and measures of
real economic activity—are widely thought to be linked
to movements in the consumer price index (CPI) and
other gauges of inflation.
To determine whether indicator variables can in fact
predict inflation, we construct a simple forecasting
model that incorporates the variables. Our tests of the
model suggest that the indicators, used individually, 
fail to provide accurate signals of inflation. Indeed, it
appears that analysts would achieve better results by
basing their predictions on the past behavior of infla-
tion. The forecasts based on indicators also prove to be
less reliable than those produced by using a well-known
econometric model or by averaging the predictions 
of a panel of business economists. Although some
researchers have argued that the indicator variables
in combination produce reasonably good forecasts,1
simple models based on single indicators fail to yield
consistently useful information. 
Inflation Indicators
Movements in certain economic and financial market
variables are thought to presage changes in the CPI and
other broad inflation measures. Nineteen variables often
proposed as inflation indicators are listed in Table 1. For
ease of understanding, we can group all but one of these
variables into three broad classes:
XCommodity prices, such as specific prices for
oil and precious metals, or indexes of a group 
of such goods. Increases in these measures—
either in their level or in their rate of growth—
are frequently linked to higher inflation.
XFinancial indicators, such as exchange rates,
monetary aggregates, or term premia (the dif-
ference between long-term and short-term
interest rates). A decline in the exchange rate,
faster growth of the monetary aggregates, and a
widening of the term premium are all supposed
to signal increasing inflation.
XIndicators of the status of the real economy,
such as the capacity utilization and unemploy-
ment rates. Higher capacity utilization and
lower unemployment (both presumably exceed-
ing some threshold) are regarded as signs that
inflation is on the rise.
The one measure listed in the table that does not fit any
of these classes is average hourly earnings. Faster
growth in this measure is often assumed to be closely
related to rising inflation. 
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Developing a Test of the Indicator Variables 
To test the predictive power of these variables, we build
a simple statistical model that approximates how an
analyst might use indicators to forecast a change in the
CPI.2 We begin by regressing CPI growth on its own
past values. This “autoregression” essentially uses the
recent behavior of inflation to predict inflation’s future
course. We then incorporate each of the indicators in
the model to determine whether the addition of particu-
lar variables improves the accuracy of the resulting
inflation forecast.
We first estimate the model using data from the first
quarter of 1975 through the end of 1984 to produce
inflation forecasts for the eight quarters of the 1985-86
period. We then reestimate the model using data
through the end of 1985 to predict inflation for the
1986-87 period, data through the end of 1986 to predict
inflation for the 1987-88 period, and so forth. This pro-
cedure is designed to reproduce the reality that fore-
casters have data only up to the starting point of their
forecasts. Moreover, tracking the performance of the
indicators in different years allows us to assess the
robustness of their forecasting power. 
Model Specification
The model we estimate relates quarterly CPI growth 
to “lagged,” or past, values of CPI growth and lagged 
values of individual indicators. The lag periods are the
same in all regressions: we use the values of CPI growth
in the preceding four quarters and the value of the indi-
cator in the preceding quarter.3
To be sure, this specification of the model is some-
what arbitrary. In principle, the model could include
more than one indicator. Furthermore, the optimal lag
periods for CPI growth and the indicator could vary from
period to period, as well as from indicator to indicator.
However, we believe that our simple model is sufficiently
representative to reveal whether one or more of the
indicators are consistently useful for inflation forecasts.
Producing Forecasts  
To generate inflation forecasts using this model, we
enter the lagged values for inflation growth and the
individual indicators in our estimated regressions. This
poses little problem when we are forecasting the first of
the eight quarterly CPI values in each projection period.
For example, to forecast inflation in the first quarter of
1985, we enter separately the values for CPI growth in
each of the four quarters of 1984 and the value of the
indicator for the fourth quarter of 1984. The difficulty
comes when we put ourselves in the position of an ana-
lyst who is seeking to forecast CPI growth for, say, the
second quarter of 1985 but who has hard data on infla-
tion and the indicator only through the end of 1984. The
model specification requires us to enter values for infla-
tion and the indicator for first-quarter 1985. A straight-
forward method of estimating the value for inflation—
and the method we use in our analysis—is to adopt the
inflation forecast for first-quarter 1985 produced by the
model. Estimating the lagged value of the indicator, how-
ever, is more complicated, because the model does not
generate predictions of the future value of this variable.
One way to circumvent this problem would be to pro-
duce inflation forecasts only for those periods in which
the analyst had available the data on the lagged value of
the indicator. However, since the value of the indicator
for the quarter immediately preceding the projection
period is included in the model, this strategy would
limit our inflation forecast to only one period. 
Perhaps a better solution to the problem is to make
the extreme assumption that an analyst with expertise
in, say, oil prices could predict the future values of this
indicator with complete accuracy.4 This assumption
gives us a clean and simple way to test the value of the
indicator. Accordingly, in our model, we capture the
idea of a perfect forecast by using the actual values of
the indicator for the lagged values in the forecast
period. For example, to arrive at an inflation forecast
for the second quarter of 1985, we use the actual price
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Average hourly earnings in private nonfarm business, growthIn sum, the steps of our analysis are as follows: We
estimate our model for every indicator over sample
periods starting with the first quarter of 1975 and end-
ing with the fourth quarter of every year from 1984 to
1996. Using the regression estimates for the sample
periods ending in one year, we then produce forecasts of
inflation. Our forecasting horizon is eight quarters, 
a period often used for policy discussions. We find 
little qualitative change in our results when we adopt
horizons of four or twelve quarters.5
A Measure of Forecast Performance
To assess the accuracy of our inflation forecasts, we 
use the root-mean-squared-error (RMSE) statistic. This 
statistic measures the degree to which the predicted
change in the CPI deviates from the actual change over
the forecast period.6 The conventional procedure for
testing a variable’s ability to forecast inflation involves
determining whether the variable, when added to a
model, lowers the RMSE. 
Note, however, that the RMSE measure does not
provide a definitive test of a variable’s ability to predict
inflation. People can react to an economic forecast in
such a way as to change the path of the economy from
that initially predicted. Most important, if the Federal
Reserve and other policymakers take seriously a fore-
cast of increased inflation and then adopt stabilizing
policies, the increase in inflation may not materialize.
Thus, demonstrating that a particular indicator accu-
rately forecasts inflation could invite offsetting policy
actions and lead to a weakening of the indicator’s pre-
dictive performance in the future. Likewise, a particular
inflation forecast might miss the mark quite dramati-
cally because policymakers heeded its prediction and
reacted appropriately.7
One can, of course, make forecasts of inflation that
take into account the reactions of policymakers. Private
forecasters presumably factor into their predictions the
likely responses of policymakers. Nevertheless, repre-
senting the reactions of policymakers in the framework
of a simple model is extremely difficult.8
These considerations limit the conclusions we can
draw from statistical tests of the accuracy of the infla-
tion forecasts generated by our model. However, given
that policy moves to control inflation take effect over a
relatively long horizon, our two-year forecast period
may be brief enough to preclude much of the impact of
such moves. Consequently, we may be justified in 
viewing the RMSE statistic as a reasonably reliable 
measure of forecasting performance. 
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Table 2
Performance of Indicators in Forecasting Inflation Eight Quarters Ahead 
Model: DCPIt = a + S4
i =1b i  DCPIt-i+ dINDt-1+ et
Number of Indicators That Performed Root-Mean-Squared Error
Regression  Projection Better Than Worse Than
Period Period Autoregression Autoregression Autoregression Best Indicator  Worst Indicator
1975:1 1984:4 1985:1 1986:4 12 7 3.19 1.90 6.59
(NAPM composite index) (Employment/pop. ratio)
1975:1 1985:4 1986:1 1987:4 10 9 2.77 1.94 5.22
(JOC index, growth) (M1)
1975:1 1986:4 1987:1 1988:4 9 10 2.37 1.94 4.44
(Unemployment rate) (Price of gold)
1975:1 1987:4 1988:1 1989:4 2 17 0.99 0.91 5.55
(Federal funds rate [rff]) (M1)
1975:1 1988:4 1989:1 1990:4 2 17 1.44 1.36 5.68
(Exchange rate, growth) (MI)
1975:1 1989:4 1990:1 1991:4 8 11 2.02 1.74 3.51
(Price of oil) (Exchange rate, level)
1975:1 1990:4 1991:1 1992:4 12 7 3.21 1.44 4.89
(NAPM diffusion index) (Exchange rate, level)
1975:1 1991:4 1992:1 1993:4 12 7 1.24 0.51 3.36
(10-year bond rate - rff) (M1)
1975:1 1992:4 1993:1 1994:4 9 10 1.59 0.84 2.91
(M2) (Monetary base)
1975:1 1993:4 1994:1 1995:4 7 12 1.31 0.90 2.95
(M2) (JOC index, growth)
1975:1 1994:4 1995:1 1996:4 6 13 0.74 0.53 3.38
(Price of gold) (M1)
1975:1 1995:4 1996:1 1997:4 9 10 1.25 0.78 2.83
(Price of oil) (M1)
1975:1 1996:4 1997:1 1998:4 8 11 2.12 0.34 2.85
(M1) (Capacity utilization rate) Model Results: How the Indicators Performed
What does our analysis reveal about the predictive
power of the indicators? First, we learn whether, in each
period, forecasters could have improved their predic-
tions by choosing one of the indicators at random and
incorporating it in the forecasting model along with
past values of inflation. Table 2 shows for every period
the RMSE of the forecast produced by the autoregres-
sion (that is, the forecast generated solely from past val-
ues of inflation), the number of indicators that produced
a better forecast, the number that produced a worse one,
and the RMSEs of the forecasts produced by the best
and worst indicator for that period. 
We see that, in most periods, incorporating an indi-
cator selected at random would have produced a worse
inflation forecast than that produced by a model based
simply on inflation’s past values. The total number of
indicators that produced forecasts better than the
autoregression fluctuated between twelve and two.
Typically, the majority of indicator-based forecasts
were less accurate than the autoregression benchmark.
And in some periods, the best indicator outperformed
the autoregression by only the most modest of margins. 
Second, we learn whether some indicators provided
more reliable forecasts than others. Although forecast-
ers would usually have been better off ignoring all the
indicators than choosing an indicator at random, they
may still have found some indicators to be superior to
others. Table 3 reports how well each indicator per-
formed relative to the autoregression over all periods
and how frequently each produced the best or the worst
forecast for the full set of indicators examined.
Ten of the nineteen indicators were consistently
worse at forecasting inflation than the autoregression—
that is, they underperformed the autoregression more
than half the time. In particular, incorporating the
future path of the exchange rate level and the growth of
the monetary aggregate M1 almost always weakened
the performance of the model and produced RMSEs
that were often larger than those of other indicators. The
interest rate variables, the unemployment rate, the mon-
etary base, the employment-to-population ratio, the
capacity utilization rate, and the composite index pro-
duced by the National Association of Purchasing
Management (NAPM) also repeatedly reduced the
accuracy of the forecasts generated.
A number of indicators, however, seemed to work
well—among them, growth in the Journal of Commerce
(JOC) price index for industrial materials, M2 growth,
and growth in average hourly earnings and weekly
hours worked. Adding these indicators to the model
consistently increased the precision of the inflation
forecasts. Nevertheless, as aids in forecasting, these
indicators may not warrant much confidence. Although
growth in the Journal of Commerce index proved supe-
rior to the autoregression nine times out of thirteen, on
one occasion it yielded the single worst forecast. 
M2 growth and growth in the labor market mea-
sures—average hourly earnings and weekly hours
worked— are problematic in a different way. In our for-
mulation, forecasters must predict the future values of
the indicators in order to produce an inflation forecast
for more than one quarter ahead. But the future values
of M2 and the labor market measures are closely tied to
inflation itself: movements in M2 are highly dependent
on movements in nominal interest rates and output, and
growth in average hourly earnings and in weekly hours
worked is easily influenced by changes in inflation and
real output. This interrelationship with the variable
being predicted undercuts the usefulness of these 
indicators; forecasters need an indicator whose future
values can be predicted independently of inflation. 
Three of the other variables tested—the price of
gold, the price of oil, and the level of the Journal of
Commerce price index for industrial materials—also
usually increased the accuracy of the inflation forecasts.
And unlike movements in M2 and the labor market mea-
sures, moderate movements in the price of all these
commodities might be predicted with little reference to
future movements in overall price inflation. 
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Table 3
Ranking the Inflation Indicators
Number of Times the Indicator
Produces Produces
Outperforms Underperforms Best Worst
Indicator Autoregression Autoregression Forecast Forecast
JOC index, growth 9 4 1 1
JOC index, level  10 3 — —
NAPM diffusion index 7 6 1 —
Price of gold 9 4 1 1
Price of oil 8 5 2 —
Exchange rate, growth 8 5 1 —
Exchange rate, level 0 13 — 2
Monetary base 4 9 — 1
M1 1 12 1 6
M2 8 5 2 —
Federal funds rate (rff)2 1 1 1 —
10-year bond rate – rff 58 1 —
Comm. paper rate – rff 21 1 — —
Weekly hours 8 5 — —
NAPM composite index 5 8 1 —
Capacity utilization rate 5 8 — 1
Unemployment rate 2 11 1 —
Employment/pop. ratio 4 9 — 1
Average hourly earnings 9 4 — —Nevertheless, a closer look at the evidence suggests
that we should be wary of interpreting movements in
these variables as forerunners of changes in inflation
trends. Table 4 reports the effect on inflation of a unit
increase in the Journal of Commerce index and a dollar
increase in the price of gold and the price of oil over
horizons of four, eight, and twelve quarters.9 One would
expect increases in the price of industrial materials,
gold, and oil to be associated with a rise in inflation.
What the table shows, however, is that increases in these
commodity prices precede future declines in inflation.
According to our statistical results, an increase of one
dollar in the price of oil is associated with a drop in the
annual rate of inflation of 0.22 percentage points after
four quarters.
How should we interpret this surprising finding? We
observed earlier that a weak statistical relationship
between an indicator and inflation could arise if policy-
makers heeded the inflation signals of an indicator and
took some offsetting action. In that case, inflation
would be unchanged, and the statistical relationship we
expected to find would diminish or disappear. However,
it is quite unlikely that a policy response would result in
a statistical relationship that was the opposite of what
we expected.10 Indeed, the illogical nature of this rela-
tionship prevents us from putting much stock in the 
seemingly good showing of gold prices, oil prices, and
the Journal of Commerce index as inflation indicators. 
Alternative Forecasting Tools
The indicators do poorly both in an absolute sense and
relative to some obvious alternatives. Consider the per-
formance of the two-year inflation forecasts of the Blue
Chip Consensus (Table 5). These forecasts, a simple
average of the predictions of several dozen business
economists who use a variety of techniques, almost
always proved more accurate than the autoregression.
Forecasts based on the complex, multi-equation econo-
metric model of Data Resources Incorporated (DRI)
outperformed the autoregression eleven times out of
thirteen, and on two of these occasions—most notably
in 1991-92—also beat the forecasts of both the Blue
Chip Consensus and the best of the indicators (compare
Tables 2 and 5).
Even the Blue Chip and DRI forecasts have their
limitations, however. The RMSE of the forecasts is
often more than 1 percentage point—a large miss when
inflation is in the area of 2 or 3 percent a year. More
important, perhaps, the information in these forecasts is
cloudy from a policy perspective. The Blue Chip panel
and the DRI modelers surely take into account likely
future changes in policy and adjust their forecasts
accordingly. Consequently, policymakers who might
consult these forecasts would need to filter out such
adjustments to obtain a true reading of the likely course
of inflation in the absence of policy changes. 
Conclusion 
No single indicator in our simple statistical framework
clearly and consistently improved autoregressive pro-
jections. The indicators we found to be reasonably well
correlated with overall price inflation either are inher-
ently difficult to forecast independently of inflation or
bear an inverse relationship to inflation that seems to
defy all logic.
Where does our analysis leave the general topic of
inflation indicators? It is conceivable that more com-
plex statistical methods will show the superiority of one
of these indicators. Researchers might also want to 
pursue the possibility that a combination of these indi-
cators could produce a consistently useful measure.11
But clearly there is good reason to be wary of placing
too much confidence in forecasts of inflation that rest
on the signals from a single indicator.
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Table 4
Effect of Unit Increase in Indicators
on Inflation, Estimated from 1975–97 Sample
Percentage Points 
Four Eight Twelve
Indicator Quarters Quarters Quarters
JOC index, level  -0.04 -0.06 -0.08
Price of gold -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
Price of oil -0.22 -0.41 -0.60
Note: The long-run effects of the unit increases are -0.12 for the JOC
index, -0.03 for the price of gold, and -3.42 for the price of oil.
Table 5
Forecasting Performance of Blue Chip, DRI, and
Autoregressive Models
Root-Mean-Squared Error
Projection Period Autoregression Blue Chip DRI
1985:1  1986:4 3.19 2.96 2.50
1986:1  1987:4 2.77 2.14 1.97
1987:1  1988:4 2.37 0.78 0.51
1988:1  1989:4 0.99 0.99 0.94
1989:1  1990:4 1.44 1.73 1.86
1990:1  1991:4 2.02 1.90 2.03
1991:1  1992:4 3.21 0.91 0.50
1992:1  1993:4 1.24 0.78 0.78
1993:1  1994:4 1.59 0.84 0.79
1994:1  1995:4 1.31 0.77 0.90
1995:1  1996:4 0.74 0.79 0.60
1996:1  1997:4 1.25 0.83 0.71
1997:1  1998:4 2.12 1.32 1.12CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE
Notes 
1. See Stock and Watson (1999).
2. We have no specific knowledge of how analysts actually use
these indicators in making inflation forecasts.
3. Akaike information criterion tests on every sequential combi-
nation from one-quarter up to eight-quarter lags on CPI growth
and the indicator showed that the combination of a four-quarter lag
on CPI growth and a one-quarter lag on the indicator was almost
always better than any other. Adjusting lag lengths for the five top-
performing indicators had a marginal effect on their performance.  
4. An alternative solution might be to develop an independent or
recursive forecasting methodology for the indicator, such as a vector
autoregression (VAR) model of overall inflation and the indicator.
5. Our statistical analysis compares quarterly inflation forecasts
with actual quarterly inflation. It is possible that our results could
change if we examined actual and forecast changes in the price level
over the full eight-quarter projection period. This issue may be worth
examining, although quarter-to-quarter changes in inflation tend to
be fairly mild, lessening the likelihood that this distinction would 
be material. Moreover, if one wanted to look at the multiperiod
inflation forecast, the regression should be specified to capture the
multiperiod inflation process. However, the horizon that forecasters
and policymakers focus on can change; for that reason, the flexi-
bility of single-quarter inflation forecasting is advantageous.
6. More precisely, the RMSE is the square root of the average
squared deviation of the differences between the forecast and actual
values of inflation. Suppose inflation is 2 percent over two periods,
but is forecast to be 1 percent in the first period and 5 percent in the
second. The errors in the inflation forecast are 1 percentage point in
the first period and –3 percentage points in the second. The squares
of these errors are 1 in the first period and 9 in the second period;
the sum of the squared errors is 10; the mean squared error is then 5,
and its square root is 2.24. Thus, the RMSE of this inflation forecast
is 2.24 percentage points. In contrast, the average error of the fore-
cast is –1 percentage point (1 plus –3 divided by 2), and the average
absolute error is 2 percentage points (1 plus 3 divided by 2).
7. The paradox that a good forecast of inflation may not hold up
while a bad forecast may provide useful information is an example
of what has been referred to as either the “Lucas critique” or
“Goodhart’s law.” The critique is named for Robert Lucas, and the
law for Charles Goodhart—economists who explained in the 1970s
how such ironies plagued the statistical evaluation of economic
stabilization policies and the reliability of monetary policy targets
and indicators.
8. Policymakers’ reactions are often modeled by a stable linear
function relating changes in operating instruments (such as the fed-
eral funds rate) to deviations of outcomes from goals (such as infla-
tion targets). The assumption of a stable linear response may be
rather difficult to justify. 
9. The estimates were derived from the analysis of regressions of
the type used in Tables 2 and 3 and estimated over a 1975-97 sample
period. Blomberg and Harris (1995) provide a more thorough
review of commodity prices as inflation indicators. They find that
commodity price movements weaken as signals of inflation after the
mid-1980s.
10. One might interpret this result as showing that policymakers
consistently overreact to the indicator, but this explanation seems
quite far-fetched. 
11. As Stock and Watson (1999) attempt to do. For a good discus-
sion of their approach to inflation forecasting, see Fisher (2000).
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